Friday, January 9, 2009

Mortgages, Congress and Contractual Rights

A number of stories regarding mortgages and Congress have been circling this week. More specifically, Congress has been working on legislation that would allow bankruptcy judges to modify mortgage contracts. In fact, some of the rumored provisions only apply to second homes and investment properties. There are some serious issues with this sort of idea.



The concept is that lenders are reluctant to write down the principal of mortgages that are in default. If you are a bank that lent say $200,000 on a mortgage and the buyer stopped paying while the value of the home is now say $180,000, you obviously lost money. In normal times, the borrower still owes you $200,000, but obviously can't pay. The property gets foreclosed and the bank sells the home at a loss, recouping as much as possible. In such a case, the bank propbably will lose over $30,000 on a $200,000 investment. However, before foreclosing, the bank could have decided to refinance the loan into a) a longer maturity, b) a lower rate and/or c) knocked the loan balance down to say $190,000 in acknowledgement that losing $10,000 is better than losing $30,000, provided the new terms make the home affordable for the homeowner. Sort of a win-win where both the lender and buyer get something by cutting their losses.

Lenders are reluctant to reduce the loan amount for obvious reasons though: the buyer signed a contract where they can't keep up their end of the bargain, so why should the bank set a precedent of leniency? If you lent $1000 to your 20 year old child and they come back and say "you know, I really just can't pay right now because my car needs brakes", do you say "that's ok, not only will I let you pay me back in a few months even though you promised it would only be one month, but just give me back $800 and we'll call it even"? I don't think so. The financial system uses other peoples money, it is not the Bank of Mom/Dad. Doing such a thing would encourage people to default after they borrowed and spent the money. Just like the 20-year old would try that trick over and over.

Also consider that in the U.S. a mortgage is a non-recourse collaterized obligation. That means the loan is secured by the property- don't pay and you turn over the keys. But it is also non-recourse meaning that in the example above, the bank can't come after you to recoup its losses. The bank gets the house, that's it. The lender takes the risk in exchange for the property, no more, no less. Pretty darn fair, actually.

So, Congress is trying to pass legislation that effectively says, if you can't make your payments and file for bankruptcy, the judge has the power to modify the mortgage and lower the amount you owe. Remember, the mortgage is a contract with no recourse unlike credit card debt. If you owe on a credit card and can't pay, the interest starts racking up at 15, 20, 25 even 30%. The card company has no collateral and so can come after you for the full amount even if you can only pay say 80% of the balance. Bankruptcy judges protect the borrower from this by being able to write off some of that debt.

It is the non-recourse collaterized feature that makes mortgages carry such low interest. But if the contract can be re-written after the fact despite the protections for borrowers, who is going to make a loan? Think about it: what good is a contract if the contract can be rewritten unilaterally without negotiation? The collateral is no good, since the contract doesn't uphold the right to that collateral.

Let's flip the coin to illustrate. Say you deposit $275,000 into a bank paying you interest. Effectively you loan the bank money. Now the bank comes to you and says "we can't pay you back, so we are going to file bankrupcy where the judge can decide how much you get back." You tell them the FDIC guaranteed your deposit up to $250,000 (collateral), so at least give you$250,000. The bank says "yeah, but Congress decided to change that guarantee after you made the deposit, so you'll have to wait over a year for the judge to decide what you get." "But I need the money" Too bad. Would you lend to a bank anymore? How much interest would they have to pay you to make the risk worthwhile? Outrageous!

Congress is unilaterally taking away the protections that make the loans so inexpensive for borrowers. In finance, risk is "priced" by the expected return: A higher risk of default or the less safe an investment is, the more the investor demands in compensation for taking that risk. Make a loan to someone less likely to pay and the interest rate is going to be higher. If mortgages are effectively no longer bound to the terms of the contract, they become much, much riskier and the rate will climb to compensate the lender for that risk and/or only the most credit worthy will be offered loans (another way to reduce risk is to make safer loans). Is tighter credit and higher rates what we need?

Even more puzzling, I have heard but can't confirm, is that Congress is targeting these measures on second homes and investment properties. This makes no sense to me. Why protect an investor who speculated? Last I checked, second homes and investment properties (like that lake or ski rental your neighbor owns) is not part of the American Dream of owning a home to live in. Why is a Democratic Congress trying to protect such luxuries?

To be sure, modification of loan terms is an appropriate tool when done fairly (primarily through lower interest rates and longer maturities- this drops the payments considerably without giving away principal). Lenders and the government have programs to help refinance existing loans. To date, they have been a failure- such programs have modified far fewer loans than planned and out of those loans modified, over 50% have defaulted anyway.

I have a hunch this action is Congressional retribution against lenders (i.e. punishment or threat of) and not intelligent policy making intended to help the situation. No one said Congress is rational.

9 comments:

  1. Hold on. A corporation in Chapter 11 can do exactly this - restructure the loan and mortgage obligations. This sometimes means that lenders take back the assets but not always. Often, for instance, they take equity instead of the debt (or the asset), and most of the time the total value they receive is lower than the value of the initial debt. When you are high on the pecking order (as secured loans would be), you receive more of course.

    Why not allow this for individuals? Lower the principal, get part of the equity, for instance?

    As for the lower interest payments, this essentially implies below market which is also a write down for the bank.

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  2. Yes, lenders will sometimes exchange debt or assets for equity. However, the choice is up to them, not the court. Lenders don't have to take that deal. What we're talking about is forcing them to take it. This is what GM is currently trying to do and lenders are balking. They can take what is left in bankruptcy or they can try for more out of the equity, no one is forcing them into one or the other.

    Getting part of future equity in exchange for principal is a great idea and I'm all for it. But it should be up to the bank whether they want the equity. Perhaps the bank or another investor does, in which case let's enable these sort of deals. Forcing terms reduces secured, non-recourse contracts to useless.

    I never implied below market rates, but while that would be a subsidy of sorts it actually increases the value of the servicing rights (far too complicated to get into here, I just thought I'd mention it). Most often a troubled loan is at a rate higher than the market, so going below market isn't necessary to lower the rate.

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  3. "Yes, lenders will sometimes exchange debt or assets for equity. However, the choice is up to them, not the court."

    Is that true in Chapter 11? The court can effectively "cram down" provisions if the lenders cannot agree on new terms and the Debtor in possession can convince the court that this new agreement is required to have a continued enterprise. It's rare but exists as option, which means lenders have to consider it in negotiations. Did I get that wrong?

    If it exists, why not the parallel tool in mortgages? If the homeowner can convince the court that a new structure would enable them to survive, and the bank disagrees, why not cram down the new structure on the lender?

    "Most often a troubled loan is at a rate higher than the market, so going below market isn’t necessary to lower the rate"

    Side discussion unrelated to the original point: If you have CCC rated corporate bond, there is a market rate for that. Case (a): the corporation paid market rate. If you renegotiate for a lower rate, all else like risk free rate equal, that would be a below market rate, effectively lowering the present value of the asset for the lender.

    Case (b) You seem to imply that a mortgage for the average subprime borrower is above market rate. Not sure why that would be because then the borrower should be able to find a new lender at market in normal circumstances (not right now, obviously, but at the time of signing). But let's run with it. In this case, if you lowered the rate, the value to the lender also goes down. Say the lender gives out $100. The rate is above market. This loan is worth more than $100 to the lender (let's ignore service fees etc. and focus on the NPV of the loan). If you renegotiate down to market, it is worth $100 and the lender has to take an economic loss.

    The trick in both cases I think is that the alternative is not the "continued payments at market/above market rates" but "dear bank, here is the asset I can't pay any more", the present value of which is far below a continued stream of payments.

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  4. dorfl68, Good points.
    I'm not aware of Chap 11 forcing terms, only forcing renegotiation on contracts. The court has been known to threaten provisions if lenders can't agree, but I honestly don't know on what basis. And I don't know if this applies to secured, nonrecourse arrangements though as I'm not a bankruptcy attorney (so you may have a point I can't address, the question to ask is how nonrecourse, secured arrangements fair). Some provisions that might be crammed down could be say a fuel surcharge agreed to, but now the fuel has fallen dramatically in price yet the provision remains (context dependent). However, I have never heard of secured, non-resourse loans being crammed down (anecdotal). That's why the lending works this way, to protect the lender otherwise the borrower would never get the loan. Would you lend to an airline without secured collateral for example? They are one of the worst businesses- high labor costs, strained labor relations, high fixed costs, intense competition, extreme variation in fuel costs, consumer dependent, heavily regulated and a history of going bust every few years? Who in their right mind would lend to an airline without confidence in the collateral protection?

    The point is that you are abrogating a standard, proven, fair, legal contract on which the market for such loans depends. Mortgages are liquid because of these provisions. Rates would have to be higher to compensate for the added risk of cram down. Consider MBS and other pools of mortgages. Currently, no one knows who has the right to renegotiate the loan on behalf of the lender because the "lender" is a hundred or thousand different investors in the pool. Would it be fair to cram down terms without true representation? How would that process even work (getting into practical rather than conceptual matters now)?

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  5. dorfl68, on the below market rates:
    There are several reasons why a mortgage rate is above market to begin with, so lowering to market is not necessarily below market (though it may be). First, we aren't talking about just subprime loans; we can have a default or modification on a perfectly plain vanilla conforming loan. Second, loans that are defaulting were taken out a year or two ago (in general) when rates were higher than now. Simply refinancing to market rates would bring it down. Third, many loans including some subprime are based on a moving average interest rate such as LIBOR plus a spread. LIBOR diverged from market mortgage rates considerably and when many ARM's reset, they reset to rates higher than the prevailing fixed rate. So, the rate on a troubled loan may be high for reasons having little to do with credit quality.

    However, there can certainly be the circumstance you describe where someone gets a rate and due to their credit (or change in credit) a lower rate would be a subsidy (below market). I don't have the stats, but the range of possible situations given the composition of current bad loans indicates to me more of the situations in the first paragraph than your scenario.

    I agree that the "alternative is not the 'continued payments at market/above market rates'”. If the bank has a choice, they will prefer to subsidize the rate rather than the principal because it is safer for their balance sheet. A lower rate only impacts the net interest margin whereas the principal writedown requires charge-offs and balance sheet adjustments.

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  6. On the cram down, found this tedious link: http://library.findlaw.com/2000/Jun/22/130692.html

    somewhere half through are the details, which I interpret to say "cram down to secure is possible but only if there is no other way". Looks like all others have to be impaired significantly first. However, I also read this as "if the market value of the asset falls, the lender is only secured to the level of the market value". I am not a lawyer and reading this reinforces me in that decision, but the following seems to say that if the value of the asset falls, the lender has to get at least 100% of the value of the collateral, which one could read as "as long as it is 100%, the cram down is fair":
    "With respect to secured claims, § 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that the secured creditor must:(i) retain its lien and receive cash payments which total at least the allowed amount of its secured claim and which has a present value equal to the value of its collateral"

    [btw, any way to put quotes, indents etc. in these comments?]

    So, I give that a "possible but unlikely". But I have to say that a rule saying "if the mortgage is more than 100% of the market value of the house, it can be corrected by the court to 100% of the house, and the lender has a choice to take that or the asset" seems to be in line with this.

    All that said, I am first in line saying that if you get a mortgage, you better make sure you can pay for it.

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  7. dorfl68
    Good find there. I read that section and I'm not sure if that settles it though. The context of that section makes me think those terms apply if cash or payment is received in lieu of the collateral itself. When the bank reposesses a house, it takes the property and not cash payment. I can't be sure about that and I'm going to guess neither one of us wants to read the bankruptcy code itself. If you do, let us know.

    For quotes and other formatting, I usually post the comment and then immediately click 'edit' next to the sig. There are formatting options in the editor.

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  8. I just saw this in Business week, January 26, page 56 (I tried to find online but couldn't)

    "Mortgages on single-family, primary residences are the only secured debt that judges can't alter in bankruptcy court - even mortgages on multifamily homes, vacation houses, and investment properties can be changed"

    Not that that negates some economic arguments, but clearly, this treatment of primary residences is the exception, not the rule (assuming business week did their research)

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  9. Looks like you are right, primary mortgages are the only truly secured ones (until now). This explains why investment properties/second homes carry much higher interest rates. I've had clients quoted 1-2% more when trying to refi second homes or investment properties recently.

    Sounds like BW was referring to personal bankruptcy and not necessarily corporate Chap 11. Might be a little different for those sorts of secured asset-backet loans.

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